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STATEMENT OF QUESTIONS PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
Plaintiffs/Appellees Grahns submit that the questions 
for review are: 
1. Have the petitioners raised an important or special 
reason which would warrant review of the decision of the Court of 
Appeals where the standards of Rule 46 of the Utah Rules of 
Appellate Procedure have not been met? 
2. Is the holding, by the Court of Appeals and the 
Trial Court that the co-petitioners, Bradshaws, were not bona fide 
purchasers of certain adjacent property, in conflict with prior 
decisions by Utah appellate courts? 
3. Do the petitioners, by presenting their contrary 
position in regard to what the evidence showed, point up a 
departure by the Court of Appeals from the accepted and usual 
course of judicial proceedings and, if so, does that departure call 
for an exercise of the Supreme Court's power of supervision? 
4. Is the petition of the Defendants/Appellants in the 
above-referenced matter frivolous as defined in Rule 3 3 of the Utah 
Rules of Appellate Procedure, and, accordingly, should sanctions 
such as attorneys1 fees be granted in favor of Plaintiffs? 
CITATION TO THE OPINION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
The unanimous opinion of the Court of Appeals was filed 
on October 24, 1990, and was published at 146 Utah Adv. Rep. 47. 
A copy is attached hereto in Appendix 1. A Petition for Rehearing 
was filed by Defendants, and denied by the Court of Appeals. 
STATEMENT OF THE JURISDICTION OF THE SUPREME COURT 
The Respondents accept the statements regarding the 
jurisdiction of the Supreme Court which are set forth in the 
Petition for Writ of Certiorari, but for the self-serving 
conclusions therein. 
NO CONTROLLING PROVISIONS 
There are no controlling provisions of constitutions, 
statutes, ordinances or regulations that are involved in the case. 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This is an action which involves reformation of a legal 
description concerning a boundary to a certain unique parcel of 
real estate in Salt Lake County. (The parcel is an estate, and not 
part of a commercial subdivision plat.) The action also involved 
the rescission of a subsequent sale of an adjacent parcel of real 
estate, which sale had been made between the Co-Petitioners. 
The remedy of reformation was sought and awarded to 
conform the deed to the intention of the parties and repair a 
mistake which had been made by the drafter of the legal 
description. The Trial Court and, thereafter, the Court of 
Appeals, by unanimous decision, ruled in favor of the Respondents 
(the "Grahns"). 
The Petitioners and the Respondents have disagreed 
throughout this matter in regard to what facts were established by 
the evidence. In essence, the Trial Court and the Court of Appeals 
found that the evidence supported the Grahns1 position. The 
Statement of the Facts in the Joint Petition for Writ of Certiorari 
(the "Petition") which sets forth the Petitioners1 viewpoint is 
frustratingly inaccurate. A full review of the Record supports the 
facts as recited by the Court of Appeals (146 Utah Adv. Rep. 47, 
at 47-48, see Appendix 1, hereto) and the Trial Court's Findings 
of Fact and Conclusions of Law (Appendix 2, hereto). 
Through an exhaustive effort in the Respondents1 Brief 
to the Court of Appeals, the Grahns thoroughly demonstrated the 
Page 2 of 14 
inaccuracies advanced by Petitioners (then, the Appellants), and 
the facts which were revealed by the preponderant evidence, all 
with detailed citations to the Record, (Respondents1 Brief, pages 
4 through 24, as supplemented by Addendum 1, thereof, pages 1 
through 13.) To repeat that task in this Brief would be 
inappropriate, as those factual issues are beyond the scope of 
review now before the Supreme Court. It is significant that the 
courts below have unanimously found that the Petitioners failed to 
establish their case. 
However, it is necessary to recite certain facts which 
are relevant to the argument by Petitioners that Co-Petitioners 
Bradshaws were bona fide purchasers. 
1. Bradshaws were aware, as they considered a 
purchase of the parcel adjacent to the Grahn parcel, that the 
south and east border of the Grahns' private drive served as 
the boundary between the two parcels. (Transcript: N. 
Taylor, page 14, lines 6 through 11; page 42, lines 23 through 
25; Mrs. Bradshaw, page 390, lines 4 to 9.) 
2 • Bradshaws had been advised and were aware that 
the Grahns had purchased the improved portion of the property 
including the home thereon, and that the Grahns had been told, 
and therefore believed, that they were the owners of the 
private drive. Bradshaws were further aware of the aesthetic 
and geologic easement in favor of the Grahns along the south 
and east side of the private drive. (Transcript: Mr. 
Bradshaw, page 214, lines 4 through 23; Mrs. Gregory, page 
184, lines 24 to 25, page 185, lines 1 through 12; Mrs. 
Bradshaw, page 367, lines 17 to 19; page 374, lines 14 to 17, 
page 385, line 9; and pages 388 to 389.) 
3. Then, on October 11, 1986, some forty (40) days 
prior to their closing, Bradshaws learned of facts that 
indicated that a mistake had been made in drafting the legal 
description. Within a few days, they and Gregory came to 
understand the ramifications thereof and they were given 
numerous opportunities prior to closing, by Co-Petitioner 
Gregory, to avoid their earnest money agreement to purchase 
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the adjacent parcel. At all times prior to closing, Bradshaws 
were well aware that the Grahns had not been advised of the 
discovery of a mistake. (Transcript: Mr. Gregory, pages 312 
to 313; Mr. Bradshaw, page 399, lines 14 to 22; page 407, 
lines 2 through 8.) 
4. Bradshaws understood the risks involved, for 
them, in their proposed purchase of the adjacent parcel. 
(Transcript: Mr. Bradshaw, page 399, lines 14 to 22; Mrs. 
Gregory, page 196, lines 16 to 22.) 
5. Bradshaws chose to accept those risks and to 
purchase the adjacent parcel; but only with the benefit of a 
side agreement which would allow them to avoid the purchase 
if they could not have the land which encroached across the 
private drive of the Grahns. Pursuant to the side agreement, 
that land was only quit-claimed to Bradshaws. (Exhibit 13-P; 
Transcript: Mrs. Gregory, pages 178-179, lines 12 to 25, 1 
to 11; Mrs. Bradshaw, page 384, lines 4 to 13, page 387, lines 
15 to 25.) 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI SHOULD BE DENIED 
FOR LACK OF AN IMPORTANT OR SPECIAL REASON FOR REVIEW. 
Rule 49(a)(9) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure 
("URAP11) provides that, in a petition for Writ of Certiorari, the 
petitioner shall submit: 
[w]ith respect to each question presented, a direct and 
concise argument explaining the special and important reasons 
as provided in Rule 46 for the issuance of the Writ. 
Rule 46, URAP, refers to the types of issues which present special 
and important reasons appropriate for Supreme Court consideration. 
The Justices of the Court are certainly familiar with the 
standards. Appropriate reasons include: inconsistencies between 
decisions of different panels of the Court of Appeals on the same 
issue of law; inconsistencies between the decision of the Court of 
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Appeals and a decision of the Supreme Court, on state or federal 
law; or departures from the accepted and usual course of judicial 
proceedings• 
The Petitioners fail to set forth and establish any such 
important or special reason. No question of municipal, state or 
federal law has been presented in this matter. The Petitioners 
fail to demonstrate that the Court of Appeals decision in this 
matter was inconsistent with any other Utah ruling. Instead, the 
Petitioners categorically claim departures have been made from the 
accepted and usual course of judicial proceedings, and then, 
without describing the claimed departure, essentially reargue the 
case as it was argued both at the trial level and again at the 
level of the Court of Appeals. 
The Petitioners attempt to reargue their position, citing 
the Grahns, the Trial Court and the Court of Appeals as their 
opposition. Without citations to the Record, they set forth 
statements "of fact" to support their theory. (As noted above, the 
factual arguments are not well grounded in the Record.) 
Mindful that the issue before this Court is whether to 
grant certiorari, the Grahns will refrain from following the 
Petitioners into a reargument of the case below. It should suffice 
to note that both the Trial Court and the Court of Appeals 
concluded differently than the Petitioners would like them to have 
concluded, and that the decisions were consistent with both the 
evidence and the applicable law. 
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In conclusion, the arguments of the Petitioners are 
merely rearguments of those points which were raised at trial level 
and then at the Court of Appeals1 level, without success. No 
special or important reason is advanced by Petitioners for review 
by the Supreme Court. Instead, the Petitioners boldly march on to 
make their arguments as if Certiorari had already been granted. 
A Writ of Certiorari is not warranted in this case. 
II. THE TRIAL COURT«S AFFIRMED HOLDING THAT THE 
BRADSHAWS WERE NOT BONA FIDE PURCHASERS IS CONSISTENT WITH UTAH 
CASE LAW. 
In their third argument, the Petitioners readdress and 
reargue their claim that the Bradshaws were bona fide purchasers, 
and that, as a result, reformation could not be made. Petitioners 
indicated that the Trial Court and the Court of Appeals 
contradicted previous law in Utah on the subject. Yet, Petitioners 
cite no previous law which is inconsistent with that decision. 
Their argument is on the facts. 
The decision of the Court of Appeals on this point was 
consistent with law. As indicated in the opinion of the Court of 
Appeals, it was clear from the evidence that Bradshaws could not 
have been bona fide purchasers. 
Petitioners, at trial and on appeal, based their bona 
fide purchaser claim on the argument that the sale took place at 
the time that the Bradshaw/Gregory earnest money agreement was 
entered into, and not the closing thereon. The Court of Appeals 
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rely blindly upon the mistaken deed. 
Bradshaws learned of the mistake in the property description, and of its effect, forty (40) days 
prior to closing on the property. They knew that the Grahns were unaware of the mistake. They understood the 
effect of the mistake, but chose to press forward to see if they could take advantage of the situation. They 
refused opportunities to rescind the deal, which were granted to them by Co-Petitioner Gregory. They went ahead 
to close, taking the title to the property in question by Quit Claim Deed only; but, even then, not before a 
side agreement was entered into which would allow them to avoid the purchase if they could not have the land 
which encroached across the private drive. As Bradshaws well knew, the Grahns reasonably believed that the 
private drive was on Grahn land. Bradshaws also knew that Gregory intended and believed, prior to learning of 
the mistake, that he had already conveyed that private drive to the Grahns. (Citations to the Record in regard 
to each of these facts are indicated in the Statement of the Case, above.) 
4 
The ruling of the Court of Appeals was consistent with 
Utah case law, and not contradictory thereto as claimed by 
Petitioners. That Court and Petitioners both cite the Utah case 
of Hottinger v. Jensen, 684 P.2d 1271 (Utah 1984). In fact, in 
their argument's introductory sentence, Petitioners quote as 
follows: 
The right of reformation of a deed can be cut off by purchase 
of the property by a bona fide purchaser for value without 
notice of the mistake. (Id., at 1273, emphasis supplied) 
Clearly, that statement by the Court resolves the question raised 
by Petitioners. The conveyance to be reformed, that to the Grahns, 
was prior in time to that conveyance to the Bradshaws. Before the 
Bradshaw closing, Bradshaw had notice of the mistake. 
There is no reason, special, important or otherwise, for 
the Supreme Court to grant certiorari to review this issue. The 
Petitioners1 argument is frivolous. 
III. THERE HAS BEEN NO DEPARTURE FROM THE ACCEPTED AND 
USUAL COURSE OF JUDICIAL PROCEEDINGS, AND THERE IS NO REASON FOR 
THE EXERCISE OF THE SUPREME COURT'S POWER OF SUPERVISION. 
The Petitioners allege in their first and second 
arguments that the Trial Court and the Court of Appeals, in a 
nutshell, failed to get the point. By cross reference between the 
Statement of Questions Presented for Review in the Petition (page 1 
thereof) and their first two arguments, it is apparent that the 
Petitioners allege for purposes of certiorari that the Court of 
Appeals departed from the accepted and usual course, by altering 
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that the parties "accepted" a figure of 1.11 acres as the size 
of the Grahn parcel, the Grahns had carried their burden and 
established that the questionable finding was clearly 
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proceedings. In fact, the Petitioners seem to draw the conclusion 
that there must have been a departure, because the courts did not 
see the evidence as they would have liked. 
Because facts are argued in the Brief by Petitioners, as 
if certiorari had been granted, it is tempting to demonstrate in 
response the weakness of those arguments. However, again, the 
Grahns recognize that arguments concerning the Record are beyond 
the scope of the issue now before the Court. They will therefore 
refrain. 
One argument is heavily relied upon by the Petitioners, 
maybe as a claimed demonstration of a departure from the usual 
course. The argument is that: 
* * * the legal description in the agreement and in the 
deed were exactly what the parties intended and were in 
essential terms identical. Thus there was no mistake made by 
a drafter of the deed. (Petition, page 11.) 
This point is then compared with the cases of Chesapeake Homes, 
Inc. v McGraff 240 A.2d 245 (MD App. 1968) and Eiland v. Powell, 
136 W.Va. 25, 65 SE2d 737, 742 (1951). 
The assertion is not consistent with the Findings of Fact 
(Appendix 2), which were affirmed. Neither of the cases referred 
to represents Utah case law. Neither is demonstrated to be 
contradictory to Utah rulings. Neither is contradictory to the 
ruling in Grahn v. Gregory. 
2 
Those cases involved platted commercial subdivisions. In each case, a party entered into an agreement 
to purchase a lot by reference to a lot number. In each case, a mistake had allegedly been made by a sales 
agent in making representations in regard to the boundaries of the platted lot. The representations were not 
documented. The true facts were easily determinable by inquiry. Each court found that the parties had not had 
a meeting of the minds and that reformation would not be appropriate. The Grahn matter is easily distinguished. 
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It is therefore evident that there is no conflict even 
with the case law of other jurisdictions which is raised for 
consideration by this Court. There has been no departure from 
accepted and usual procedure. There is no special and important 
reason to justify the granting of the Petition for a Writ of 
Certiorari. 
IV. THE PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI IS FRIVOLOUS, 
AS DEFINED IN RULE 33(b) OF THE UTAH RULES OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE. 
According to Rule 33(b), URAP, a petition to the Supreme 
Court which lf * * * is not grounded in fact, not warranted by 
existing law, or not based on a good faith argument to extend, 
modify, or reverse existing law" is frivolous. For reasons set 
forth in the foregoing arguments, the Grahns respectfully submit 
that the Petition is frivolous. It does not meet the said Rule 
33(b) standards or those implied by Rule 46, URAP. 
The good faith submission of the Petition is clearly in 
doubt. 
1. As indicated above, and as might be established 
by painstaking resort to the Grahns1 Brief to the Court of 
Appeals, and the Record cited therein, the Petitioners have 
advanced "facts" for consideration by this Court which are not 
established in the Record. They make no meaningful effort to 
cite the Court to the Record, as an investigation of their 
general citations to the transcript would make evident. 
In this matter a single estate lot was privately divided into two parcels, along the edge of a private drive 
which was to separate the two. The subdivider (Gregory) directed and intended that the drive would be the 
boundary. He believed it was, and so advised the Grahns personally, and through his agents. Unfortunately, 
the scrivener of the metes and bounds description did not accurately describe that boundary location, even 
though he intended to, and thought he had done so. The earnest money agreement between Grahns and Gregory even 
documented that intent. The Trial Court, affirmed by the Court of Appeals, found that the parties had agreed 
as to what land was being purchased and ordered reformation of the deed accordingly. 
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2. Petitioners claim that existing law is 
inconsistent with the decision of the Court of Appeals, but 
fail to cite the law to which they refer. Petitioners fail, 
further to submit any argument to extend, modify or reverse 
existing law. 
3. Petitioners claim that there were departures 
from the accepted and usual course of judicial proceedings, 
but fail to explain their claim. 
4. Petitioners make an issue of a claim that the 
adjacent lot was unbuildable. The issue is moot. (See 
Suggestion of Mootness, filed on even date herewith.) It is 
suggested that an inquiry would reveal that Petitioners knew 
their arguments were practically unsupportable at the time 
submitted to the Supreme Court. 
5. Finally, but certainly not least, Petitioners 
barge past the threshold of certiorari and make their 
arguments without first obtaining permission to do so. 
It is also noted that the appendix to the Petition 
exceeds the authority granted under Rule 49(a)(10) of the URAP. 
Grahns object to the appendix in the Petition. The appendix, with 
its copy of a prior Statement of Facts and of a page from the 
transcript of the trial, is prejudicial if reviewed without a 
review of the remaining portions of the Record and the Grahns1 
Brief. Those portions of the Petition's appendix should be 
disregarded. 
Rule 49(e), URAP, provides that: 
The failure of a petitioner to present with accuracy, brevity, 
and clarity whatever is essential to a ready and adequate 
understanding of the points requiring consideration will be 
a sufficient reason for denying the petition. 
Grahns respectfully submit that Petitioners have failed in all 
three respects. For that reason, also, it is appropriate to deny 
the Petition. 
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Grahns submit that the Petition was therefore, frivolous. 
Under Rules 3 3 and 40, URAP, sanctions are appropriate. The 
Grahns should not have been required to incur attorneys1 fees to 
respond to the Petition. The Grahns therefore respectfully request 
that they be awarded, at the least, their attorneys' fees incurred 
in connection with their opposition to the Petition. 
CONCLUSION 
The Petition for Writ of Certiorari fails to meet the 
requisite standards, and should be denied. No special and 
important reason is raised for consideration by the Supreme Court; 
and none exists. 
The Petition fails to establish that there is an 
inconsistency between the decision of the Court of Appeals and 
other Utah case law. The Petition fails to demonstrate a departure 
from the accepted and usual course of judicial proceedings. It 
merely reargues that which did not convince the courts below. 
The Petition is frivolous, as defined by the rules, and 
sanctions are therefore appropriate. 
Respectfully submitted this J&1 day of /"<g</9 , 
1991. 
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Attorneys for 
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writing each and every argument, issue, or claim 
raised and properly before us on appeal." Stare v. 
Carter, 776 P.2d 886, 888 (Utah 1989); see Stare v. 
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not a substantial issue. 
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^ _ OPINION 
BILLINGS, JUDGE: 
Appellant Herold L. Gregory ("Gregory"), 
Trustee for and on behalf of the Marital and 
Family Trusts of the Albert Eccles Family 
Trust ('Trusts"), appeals from a district court 
order entered after a four-day trial reforming 
a land sale contract with appellees, Allen R. 
and Josephine M. Grahn ("Grahns"), and 
rescinding the sale of a contiguous parcel of 
land to appellants Dean and Christi Bradshaw 
("Bradshaws"). The Bradshaws also appeal the 
reformation of the Grahn/Gregory contract. 
The Grahns cross-appeal, claiming the trial 
UTAH 
court erred in (1) ordering them to pay for the 
additional acreage included after reformation, 
and (2) refusing to award attorney fees to 
them. We affirm in part and reverse in part. 
We recite the facts in a light favorable to 
the decision of the fact finder. See Security 
State Bank v. Broadhcad, 734 P.2d 469, 470-
71 (Utah 1987); Barnes v. Wood, 750 P.2d 
1226,1227 (Utah Ct. App. 1988). 
This dispute involves a parcel of land, 
owned by the Trusts, located at 2811 Brook-
burn Road in Salt Lake County. Before it was 
subdivided, the property was an estate consi-
sting of a home with private drive access. 
In 1984, the Trusts hired a surveyor to 
subdivide a one-half acre plot to be deeded 
to Barbara Danielson, a beneficiary of the 
Trusts. Danielson, with the knowledge of 
Gregory, instructed the surveyor to locate the 
one-half acre parcel in the southeast corner 
and to stake such a parcel "to the south and 
east off the road, us[ing] the road as the 
boundary." The larger remaining parcel was 
designated "parcel one" at trial, while the one-
half acre parcel was designated "parcel two." 
When the surveyor prepared the legal desc-
ription of parcel two, he made a four-degree 
error in describing a turn. Thus, the legal 
description of parcel two mistakenly included 
a part of the private drive which the Trusts 
and the surveyor intended to be included in 
parcel one. 
Danielson decided not to build on parcel 
two and deeded the property back to the 
Trusts. Gregory then listed both parcels with a 
broker. Gregory directed the broker to advise 
potential buyers the survey stakes placed along 
the east side of the private driveway formed 
the boundary between the two parcels and to 
assure potential buyers the private drive pro-
viding access to the existing home was part of 
parcel one. 
The broker showed the property to the 
Grahns and advised them that either or both 
of the two parcels could be purchased. The 
broker removed snow from the survey stakes 
on the south and east side of the private drive 
to identify the boundary line between the two 
parcels and to confirm the private drive was 
part of parcel one. 
The Grahns sought assurances as to the 
physical boundaries of the parcels on nume-
rous occasions and explicitly stated they 
wanted the private drive as part of parcel one. 
The Grahns were not concerned about the 
acreage of parcel one, but with the physical 
boundaries of the property as identified by the 
survey stakes. The broker testified at trial that 
because of the unique nature of the estate, it 
would be unusual for the parties to be conce-
rned with the acreage rather than the physical 
boundaries of the property. 
Both the Grahns and Gregory understood 
and intended at the time the sale was negoti-
ated that the private drive would be included 
CE REPORTS 
in the sale of parcel one to the Grahns. 
After determining to purchase parcel one, 
the Grahns sought a legal description for the 
parcel to include in the Earnest Money Agre-
ement. Josephine Grahn telephoned the Gre-
gorys requesting a legal description and was 
referred to the tax notices. Josephine Grahn 
then went to the Salt Lake County Recorder's 
Office and obtained a legal description. App-
arently, the Recorder's Office had used the 
Danielson deed on parcel two as a basis for 
the legal description for parcel one. Thus, the 
Recorder's Office subtracted the .56 acres in 
parcel two from the 1.67 acreage of the total 
property and included an 1.11 acre figure in 
the legal description of parcel one. As a result 
of the mistake on the original survey, the 
Recorder's legal description of parcel one was 
not in conformity with the physical staked 
boundaries of parcel one. Neither the Grahns 
nor Gregory were aware of the mistaken legal 
description at this time. 
The Earnest Money Agreement recited the 
1.11 acre figure and the mistaken legal descr-
iption, but also provided for an easement for 
an aesthetic break between the properties 
which would extend into parcel two "from any 
point within fifteen (15) feet of the existing 
drive which separates the two lots ...." 
The Grahns and Gregory closed the sale of 
parcel one on August 1, 1986. The legal des-
cription in the deed for the property did not 
include the 1.11 acre figure.1 The Grahns also 
received a right of first refusal to purchase 
parcel two. 
On September 1, 1986, Gregory entered into 
an Earnest Money Agreement with the Brad-
shaws for the purchase of parcel two. The 
agreement provided the sale would close by 
September 15, 1986. Also on September 1, 
Gregory informed the Grahns of his intention 
to sell the property and extended them the 
right of first refusal on parcel two in accord-
ance with the option contained in the Grahn/ 
Gregory Earnest Money Agreement on parcel 
one. Under the Earnest Money Agreement, the 
Grahns had seven days to exercise the option. 
In the event the Grahns did not exercise the 
option, the agreement provided that Gregory 
could sell parcel two within 90 days under the 
same terms and conditions offered to the 
Grahns under the option. If, however, those 
terms changed, Gregory was required to offer 
the Grahns another option term. 
The Grahns did not exercise their right of 
first refusal and, when the option expired, told 
Gregory to proceed with the sale of parcel two 
to the Bradshaws. 
On October 11, 1986, Dean Bradshaw dis-
covered the private drive was apparently 
located within the legal description of parcel 
two. The Bradshaws informed Gregory. 
Gregory contacted the surveyor. The surveyor 
admitted his mistake and completed another 
survey which correctly placed the private drive 
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within parcel one and yet still provided one-
half acre for parcel two in accordance with his 
original instructions. However, Gregory reje-
cted this survey because the Bradshaws could 
not construct the house they had designed on 
the re-drawn parcel. The surveyor was then 
instructed to draft a new survey without ref-
erence to the private drive as the boundary 
I between the parcels. 
Prior to closing the sale of parcel two, 
Gregory gave the Bradshaws the opportunity 
to avoid their agreement, but they refused. On 
November 20, 1986, Gregory and the Brads-
haws closed the sale of parcel two using the 
original mistaken legal description. At that 
time, Gregory and the Bradshaws entered into 
another agreement which provided: "In the 
event that buyer cannot obtain the full .56 
acre according to the legal description, seller 
agrees to nullify sale and refund purchase 
price.1' 
Gregory did not inform the Grahns of the 
mistaken legal description until after closing 
the sale of parcel two with the Bradshaws. 
Gregory then informed the Grahns of the 
mistake and offered to either rescind their 
agreement or to relocate the private drive 
within the boundaries of the new parcel. 
The Grahns learned the Bradshaws planned 
to immediately begin construction on their 
new home on parcel two. The Grahns, there-
fore, obtained a temporary restraining order 
to block construction and commenced this 
lawsuit seeking reformation of their deed to 
include the private drive as part of parcel one. 
The temporary restraining order was converted 
to a preliminary injunction pending resolution 
of this dispute. 
The trial court, after a five-day bench 
trial, ordered reformation of the Grahns' 
deed, finding the deed did not conform to the 
agreement between Gregory and the Grahns to 
include the private drive in parcel one. In 
addition, the trial court ordered the Grahns to 
pay $12,604.06 as the fair market value of the 
land in excess of 1.11 acres which would be 
included in the reformed parcel. The trial 
court also rescinded the agreement between 
Gregory and the Bradshaws for the sale of 
parcel two. The court awarded costs to the 
Grahns, but did not award them attorney fees. 
Gregory appeals, claiming the trial court 
erred in ordering reformation rather than 
rescission of the sale of parcel one. The Bra-
dshaws appeal, claiming the court erred in 
determining they were not bona fide purcha-
sers, thus, cutting off the Grahns' reformation 
rights and, in addition, that the trial court 
erred in denying them damages for an unla-
wful injunction which caused them to lose the 
benefit of their bargain with a material supp-
lier. The Grahns cross-appeal, claiming the 
trial court erred in ordering them to pay for 
the additional acreage and in its denial of their 
request for attorney fees. 
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MUTUAL MISTAKES-REFORMATION 
OR RESCISSION? 
Gregory initially argues the trial court erred 
in reforming the sale of parcel one to include 
the private drive. Although he concedes the 
parties both mistakenly believed the private 
drive was included in parcel one, he contends 
that under the circumstances the proper 
remedy was rescission of the sale, not refor-
mation of the contract. Gregory argues the 
parties never agreed to the contract as refo-
rmed because both parties understood that 
only 1.11 acres were included in parcel one 
and this was an essential term of the contract 
as it left parcel two with the .56 acre necessary 
for his sale of parcel two to the Bradshaws. 
Under certain circumstances, courts may 
reform an agreement to reflect the intent of 
the parties. Restatement (Second) of Contracts 
§155 (1981H states that "(wjhere a writing 
that evidences or embodies an agreement in 
whole or in part fails to express the agreement 
because of a mistake of both parties as to the 
contents or effect of the writing, the court 
may at the request of a party reform the 
writing to express the agreement, except to the 
extent that rights of third parties such as good 
faith purchasers for value will be unfairly 
affected. ^ 
The Utah Supreme Court set out the criteria 
which must be met before reformation is 
permissible in Hottlnger v. Jensen, 684 P.2d 
1271 (Utah 1984), a case similar to the one 
before us. The court stated: 
Reformation of a deed is a procee-
ding in equity and is appropriate 
where the terms of the written ins-
trument arc mistaken in that they 
do not show the true intent of the 
agreement between the parties. 
There are two grounds for reform-
ation of such an agreement: mutual 
mistake of the parties and ignorance 
or mistake by one party, coupled 
with fraud by the other party. 
This case is a clear case of mutual 
mistake by the parties. The defen-
dant and all subsequent purchasers 
except plaintiff agreed that the 
understanding and the intent of the 
parties to the various deeds was that 
the fence line be the boundary. It 
was only due to a mistake made by 
the drafter of the deed as to the 
metes and bounds described that the 
deed did not conform to the intent 
of the parties. Reformation is 
clearly appropriate where there is a 
variance between the written deed 
and the true agreement of the 
parties caused by a draftsman. 
Id, at 1273 (footnotes omitted). See also Guar-
dian State Bank v. StangU 778 P.2d 1, 4-
ftgy 49 
7 (Utah 1989); Briggs v. Liddell, 699 P.2d 770, 
772 (Utah 1985)/ 
Reformation is appropriate where the 
written instrument is not in conformity with 
the parties' agreement, not where the parties 
have failed to agree. We will not make a 
contract for the parties which they did not 
make, only reform a contract to reflect the 
I agreement they actually made.9 
| The trial court specifically found Gregory 
| had told the Grahns that the private drive was 
I included in parcel one. In addition, the court 
j found that both parties understood the private 
drive was included in parcel one and the legal 
description did not conform to the parties' 
agreement. There is also evidence that the 
parties were not concerned with the size of 
[ parcel one, but only with the physical staked 
[ boundaries of the property.* We note that we 
review the trial judge's findings of fact under 
the standard set forth in Rule 52 of the Uuh 
Rules'of Civil Procedure: "Findings of fact, 
whether based on oral or documentary evid-
ence, shall not be set aside unless clearly err-
oneous, and due regard shall be given to the 
opportunity of the trial court to judge the 
credibility of the witnesses/ Utah R. Civ. P. 
52(a). This "clearly erroneous" standard 
applies whether the case is one in equity, as is 
this case, or one at law. Sec Reid v. Mutual of 
Omaha Ins. Co., 776 P.2d 896, 899 (Utah 
1989); Barker v. Francis, 741 P.2d 548, 
551(Utah Q . App. 1987). The trial court's 
findings are amply supported by the evidence. 
Only Gregory's self-serving statements 
support his argument that the acreage included 
in parcel one was essential to the parties' 
agreement. The Utah Supreme Court has 
previously held that when a party requesting 
rescission offers only self-serving statements 
concerning the materiality of the mistake, that 
testimony is insufficient to support an order 
for rescission. See Kiahtipes v. Mills, 649 P.2d 
9,13-14 (Utah 1982). 
We agree with the trial court that the parties 
intended the private drive to be included in 
parcel one and the legal description did not 
conform to those intentions and thus conclude 
the trial court correctly reformed the deed of 
parcel one to reflect the parties' actual agre-
ement. 
UNILATERAL MISTAKE 
As a secondary claim, Gregory asserts that 
his unilateral mistake that there would be 
sufficient acreage for the Bradshaws to build 
on parcel two is grounds to rescind the sale of 
parcel one to the Grahns. 
The standard for determining whether res-
cission is the proper remedy for a unilateral 
mistake is as follows: 
1. The mistake must be of so grave 
a consequence that to enforce the 
contract as actually made would be 
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unconscionable. 
2. The matter as to which the 
mistake was made must relate to a 
material feature of the contract. 
3. Generally the mistake must have 
occurred notwithstanding the exer-
cise of ordinary diligence by the 
party making the mistake. 
4. It must be possible to give relief 
by way of rescission without serious 
prejudice to the other party except 
the loss of his bargain. In other 
words, it must be possible to put 
him in status quo. 
B & A Assocs. v. L.A. Young Sons Constr. 
Co., 139 Utah Adv. Rep. 10, 12 (Utah 1990) 
(quoting John Call Eng'g v. Manti City Corp., 
141 P.2d 1205, 1209-10 (Utah 1987)); see also 
Ashworth v. Charlesworth, 119 Utah 650, 
231 P.2d 724, 727 (1951). 
The appellant must marshal all the evidence 
which supports the trial court's findings and 
show that, in the light most favorable to the 
finding, it is against the ""clear weight of the 
evidence/ and is thus clearly erroneous when 
applied to the foregoing legal principles. See 
Smith v. Linmar Energy Corp., 790 P.2d 
1222, 1224 (Utah Ct. App. 1990); see also 
Grayson Roper Ltd. Partnership v. Finlinson, 
782 P.2d 467, 470 (Utah 1989); Scharf v. 
BMG Corp., 700 P.2d 1068, 1070 (Utah 1985). 
Gregory has failed to marshal the evidence 
in support of the trial court's findings and 
then to demonstrate that the trial court's 
findings were clearly erroneous.7 Thus, we will 
not disturb the trial court's reformation of the 
deed.* 
BONA FIDE PURCHASERS 
The Bradshaws contend they are bona fide 
purchasers of parcel two and thus cut off the 
Grahns' right to reform the deed on parcel 
one.9 The Bradshaws admit they knew of the 
mistaken description before the sale of parcel 
two was completed, but argue they submitted 
their Earnest Money Agreement on parcel two 
without notice of the mistaken legal descrip-
tion and consequent problems and since the 
Earnest Money Agreement is a binding cont-
ract, see Lach v. Deseret Bank, 746 P.2d 802, 
805 (Utah Ct. App. 1987), they are bona fide 
purchasers. The Grahns, on the other hand, 
argue the relevant time for determining bona 
fide purchaser status is at the time of 
"purchase," i.e., at the closing of the sale. 
In Utah, it is clear that a bona fide purch-
aser can cut off the right of reformation. See 
Hottinger v. Jensen, 684 P.2d 1271, 1273 
(Utah 1984) ("the right of reformation of a 
deed can be cut off by purchase of the prop-
erty by a bona fide purchaser for value 
without notice of the mistake"). 
The case law implies the essential time to 
measure knowledge is at the time of the actual 
sale. A bona fide purchaser is "one who takes 
without actual or constructive knowledge of 
facts sufficient to put him on notice of the 
complainant's equity." Blodgett v. Marsh, 590 
P.2d 298, 303 (Utah 1978) (emphasis added). 
Further, the Utah Supreme Court, in defining 
notice, has stated that 
[ajctual or constructive notice 
defeats a subsequent purchaser's 
interest. A subsequent purchaser 
must therefore, show that he had 
no actual notice, i.e., no personal 
knowledge, of a prior conveyance 
or that the prior conveyance did not 
impart constructive notice, i.e., was 
not recorded before his conveyance 
in the same land was recorded. 
Utah Farm Prod. Credit Ass'n v. Wasatch 
Bank, 734 P.2d 904, 906 n.2 (Utah 1986) (per 
curiam) (emphasis added). See also Diversified 
Equities, Inc. v. American Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 
739 P.2d 1133, 1136 (Utah 1987) (if a subs-
equent purchaser has information or facts 
which would put a prudent person upon 
inquiry which, if pursued, would lead to 
actual knowledge, an unrecorded conveyance 
is not void as against that subsequent purch-
aser). 
The Bradshaws discovered the mistake in 
the legal description more than one month 
before they closed on the sale of parcel two 
with Gregory. Gregory and the Bradshaws 
further agreed in writing that the sale would 
be nullified if the conveyance could not be as 
planned.-We agree with the trial court that the 
Bradshaws were not bona fide purchasers of 
parcel two.10 
PAYMENT FOR ADDITIONAL ACREAGE 
The Grahns appeal the trial court's order 
requiring them to pay for the additional 
acreage in the reformed deed, claiming the 
acreage included in parcel one was not a basis 
for the bargain between the Grahns and 
Gregory. They claim the agreement was that 
parcel one as circumscribed by the staked 
boundaries was to be sold for the agreed price. 
We agree. 
The Earnest Money Agreement drafted by 
the Grahns recited the 1.11 acre figure, but 
also stated that the private drive divided the 
two parcels. The deed to parcel one did not 
recite the size of the property. We do not find 
that this mistaken designation of the size of 
parcel one was central to the parties' bargain. 
The trial court stated in Finding 13: "The 
description to Parcel One was obtained by 
plaintiffs Grahn from the Salt Lake County 
Recorder[']s Office. The description design-
ated Parcel One as being 1.11 acres and acc-
epted by the trustee and defendants Grahn as 
acreage to be sold and purchased," 
This finding conflicts with the trial court's 
Finding of Fact 14 which states Gregory and 
the Grahns understood the private drive to be 
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Ithe boundary and that the technical descrip-
tion did not conform to the intents of the 
'parties. We therefore conclude that Finding of 
jFact 13 is clearly erroneous in light of the 
| evidence and its inconsistency with the court's 
j other findings and conclusions. The trial 
, court's order requiring the Grahns to pay for 
the additional acreage included is therefore 
J reversed. 
ATTORNEY FEES 
The Grahns also appeal the trial court's 
denial of their request for attorney fees, clai-
ming they should be awarded attorney fees 
because the evidence demonstrated that 
Gregory breached the option agreement, and 
but for that breach, this lawsuit would not 
have resulted. 
In Uuh, parties may recover attorney fees 
only if provided for by contract or authorized 
by statute. See Dixie State Bank v. Bracken, 
764 P.2d 985, 988 (Utah 1988); see also Arnica 
Mut. Ins. Co. v. Schcttlcr, 768 P.2d 950, 965 
(Utah Ct. App. 1989). Further, "(ijf provided 
for by contract, the award of attorney fees is 
allowed only in accordance with the terms of 
the contract." Bracken, 764 P.2d at 988. 
The contractual language in the Earnest 
Money Agreement which provides for attorney 
fees states: 
Both parties agree that, should 
either party default in any of the 
covenants or agreements herein 
contained, the defaulting party shall 
pay all costs and expenses, inclu-
ding a reasonable attorneys' fee, 
which may arise or accrue from 
enforcing or terminating this agre-
ement, or in pursuing any remedy 
provided hereunder or by applicable 
law, whether such remedy is 
pursued by filing suit or otherwise. 
The Earnest Money Agreement between the 
Grahns and Gregory included a first right of 
refusal option on parcel two. The contractual 
language of that option provided: 
Should Buyer fail to exercise 
Buyers' option under this provi-
sion, then Seller shall have the right 
to sell the property within ninety 
(90) days of the date of the expira-
tion of Sellers' said option on terms 
and conditions no more favorable 
than those originally offered under 
this paragraph to Buyer. Should the 
offer be amended making the terms 
more favorable, or should the said 
offer fail and a new offer be rece-
ived, _ then the said amendment or 
offer shall be, once again, subject 
to the terms of this provision. The 
terms of this provision shall survive 
the closing of the purchase of the 
property which is the subject of the 
main Agreement. 
The Grahns contend that after they declined 
to exercise their option to purchase parcel two, 
Gregory offered the Bradshaws more favor-
able terms and therefore Gregory breached the 
option agreement when he did not offer the 
option to the Grahns again. The Grahns assert 
that the more favorable terms are the exten-
sion of the closing date past September 15 and 
the additional agreement providing that if 
Gregory could not convey the entire .56 acres, 
the agreement was void. 
The trial court did not make a specific 
finding concerning the cause of action for 
breach of the option. The court did find, 
however, that the •(t]nistee thereafter offered 
plaintiffs a first right of refusal to purchase 
Parcel Two which was not exercised by plai-
ntiff.0 While not stating so directly, we con-
clude the trial court inferentialiy found no 
breach of the option agreement. Furthermore, 
the issue of this lawsuit concerns the amount 
of property the parties intended to convey by 
the sale of parcel one and is not the result of 
any breach of the option to purchase parcel 
two. Thus, we find that there was no default 
of the option agreement and the trial court 
correctly concluded that attorney fees should 
not be awarded. 
CONCLUSION 
We hold the trial court correctly reformed 
the land sale contract on parcel one because a 
mistake in the legal description included in the 
deed did not reflect the parties' agreement. 
We conclude the trial court was correct in 
finding the Bradshaws were not bona fide 
purchasers of parcel two and thus could not 
cut off the Grahns' right to reformation. 
Additionally, we affirm the trial court's con-
clusion that the Grahns were not entitled to 
attorney fees as this dispute did not result 
from a breach of the option agreement. 
However, we reverse the trial court's order 
requiring the Grahns to pay for the additional 
acreage included in the reformed deed as the 
facts clearly support a finding that the parties 
agreed to purchase and sell parcel one based 
on the physical boundaries of the parcel and 
decided on a price for that parcel without 
regard to the acreage of parcel one. 
Judith M. Billings, Judge 
WE CONCUR: 
Russell W. Bench, Judge 
Pamela T. Greenwood, Judge 
1. In fact, the Warranty Deed from Gregory to the 
Grahns included a legal description different from 
that in the Earnest Money Agreement. The source 
of this legal description is unknown. The legal des-
cription in the Trust Deed from the Grahns to 
Gregory was identical to the one in the Warranty 
Deed. Neither instrument recited the 1.11 acre 
figure. 
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2. Gregory asserts the applicable Restatement 
section is section 152, which states that 
(wjhere a mistake of both parties at the 
time the contract was made as to a basic 
assumption on which the contract was 
made and has a material affect on the 
agreed exchange of performances, the 
contract is voidable by the adversely 
affected party unless he bears the risk of 
mistake .... 
Restatement (Second) of Contracts §152 (1981). 
The Restatement notes, however, that 
(t]he mere fact that both parties are 
mistaken with respect to such an assu-
mption does not, of itself, afford a 
reason for avoidance of the contract by 
the adversely affected party. Relief is 
only appropriate in situations where a 
mistake of both parties has such a 
material effect on the agreed exchange 
of performances as to upset the very 
basis for the contract. 
Restatement (Second) of Contracts §152, comment 
a, at 386 (1981). 
3. A commentator describes the type of mistake a 
court may correct through reformation: 
If, on account of a mistake common to 
both parties to a bilateral transaction the 
written instrument does not express the 
true agreement of the parties, equity will 
generally correct the instrument so as to 
conform to the actual bargain. Perhaps 
the most common instance is that of a 
conveyance which, because of a mistake 
of the scrivener not discovered by either 
party, describes too much or too little 
property.... 
G. Clark, Equity §248, at 370-71 (1954). 
4. See, e.g., Jensen v. Manila Corp. of the Church 
of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints, 565 P.2d 63, 
64-65 (Utah 1977) (the written instrument failed to 
conform with the intent of the parties and the court 
reformed the deed to increase the size of the parcel 
conveyed to include the boundaries on which the 
parties had agreed). 
5. We distinguish on their facts several cases 
Gregory cites in support of his argument that resci-
ssion is the appropriate remedy. Robert Langs ton, 
Ltd. v. McQuarrie, 741 P.2d 554, 557 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1987) (The parties agreed to the sale of a 
ranching operation which included grazing permits, 
cattle and personal property. However, the parties 
were mistaken about the grazing permits, which had 
been cancelled; about the number of cattle; and also 
about the price and terms.); Eiland v. Powell, 136 
W. Va. 25, 65 S.E.2d 737, 742 (1951) (the legal 
description in the deed was identical to the legal 
description in the contract, thus there was no 
mistake by a drafter, just in the representations 
made by the seller); Chesapeake Homes, inc. v. 
McGraff, 249 Md. 480, 240 A.2d 245, 249 (Ct. 
App. 1968) (There was no mistake in the legal des-
cription of the property, the seller had misreprese-
nted the boundaries. The court correctly concluded 
the parties did not come to an agreement in the first 
instance.); Our facts are much closer to the case of 
Bartlett v. Department of Transp., 40 Md. App. 47, 
388 A.2d 930 (1978). In Bartlett, the court dealt 
with the issue of reformation of a deed when the 
parties believed the parcel to be 2-1/2 acres 
smaller than it actually was. The Bartlett court rea-
soned that if a discrepancy in the size of the parcel 
would not have prevented the party from entering 
the contract, the mistake is immaterial and reform-
ation is appropriate. Id. at 933. 
6. Despite the trial court's findings, Gregory's 
primary argument in favor of rescission is that he 
would never have entered the agreement to sell 
parcel one if he had known there would not be a 
one-half acre parcel left in parcel two after the 
subdivision. 
Gregory's position fails for several reasons. First, 
prior to the sale of parcel two to the Bradshaws, the 
surveyor drafted a revised survey using the private 
drive as a boundary, which left parcel two with one-
half acre, but Gregory rejected that survey because 
the Bradshaws* house would not fit on it. If, in 
fact, Gregory's concern was only with parcel two 
containing one-half acre, the revised survey would 
have satisfied those concerns. Further, when 
Gregory originally entered into the sale of parcel 
one to the Grahns, the Grahns had an option to 
purchase parcel two, thus the subsequent fact that 
the Bradshaws' house plans would not fit on the 
property as agreed to or the fact that a variance 
would have to be obtained would not have been 
relevant at the time of the original sale of parcel 
one. 
7. Even if Gregory had marshaled the evidence, 
however, we find from our independent review of 
the evidence that all elements for rescission based 
upon unilateral mistake were not met. 
Gregory's unilateral mistake did not relate to a 
material feature of the contract because, as previo-
usly discussed, the size of parcel two was not a 
material element in negotiating the sale of parcel 
one. 
Finally, Gregory's bald assertion that the Grahns 
can receive damages to put them back to the status 
quo is without support in the evidence. The evidence 
at trial established that the Grahns sold their prior 
home, invested at least SI0,000 in improvements to 
parcel one and put over 1600 hours of time making 
the property livable and unique to their tastes. 
8. Gregory also argues that under Utah law, a con-
tract is merged into the deed and that when the deed 
refers to a metes and bounds description which 
differs from oral references to the private drive as 
the boundary, the description in the deed prevails. 
Mutual mistake is an exception to the general rule 
that parol evidence may not contradict, vary', or add 
to a deed. Neeley v. Kelsch, 600 P.2d 979, 981 
(Utah 1979). The doctrine of merger is inapplicable 
where, as here, one of the parties demonstrates a 
mutual mistake in the drafting of the contractual 
documents has occurred. 
9. The Grahns argue the Bradshaws are not proper 
appellants as they have not appealed the rescission 
of their agreement with Gregory for the sale of 
parcel two. We disagree. The argument in the Bra-
dshaws' appeal, by inference, appeals the rescission 
of the Gregory/Bradshaw agreement. By asserting 
they are bona fide purchasers, thereby cutting off 
the Grahns' reformation rights, the Bradshaws are 
appealing the rescission of their contract which res-
ulted from that reformation. 
10. The Bradshaws argue they had an enforceable 
contract with Rocky Mountain Refractories and as a 
result of the wrongful injunction against building on 
parcel two, they are entitled to damages for the loss 
of that bargain. 
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This natter came on for trial before the Honorable John A. 
Rokich on September 24, 1987. The plaintiffs were present, and 
represented by Robert M. Taylor and John S. Adams. Defendant 
Herold L. Gregory, Trustee, and on behalf of the Marital and 
Family Trusts of the Albert Eccles Family Trust, hereinafter 
referred to as "trustee" was present, and represented by Jeffrey 
K. Woodbury. Defendants Dean Bradshaw and Christi Bradshaw, his 
wife, were present, and represented by Russell S. Walker. 
Defendant Scott McNeil was present, and represented by his 
counsel Allen Sims. 
The Court heard the testimony of witnesses, admitted 
documentary evidence, viewed the property which was the subject 
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matter of this litigation, read the Memoranda on file herein, 
heard oral arguments, and then took the matter under advisement 
pending the receipt of supplemental Memoranda. The Court 
received the supplemental Memoranda, reviewed the file, its 
notes, the Memoranda on file and the documentary evidence. 
The Court made inquiries from time to time as to the status 
of this matter. The Court was advised that the parties were 
attempting to negotiate a settlement. The Court finally called 
plaintiffs' counsel and requested that this matter be noticed up 
for hearing and that their clients be present. The hearing was 
not held because of the illness of one of the attorneys. The 
Court was advised that the parties could not enter into a 
settlement agreement, nor agree upon Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law. The Court advised counsel it could prepare 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law so that this case can be 
concluded at least on the District Court level and the parties 
can take whatever action they deem appropriate. 
The Court held a hearing on November 10, 1988 for the 
purpose of reviewing the status of this case with counsel and 
their clients. The Court explained to counsel and the litigants 
that the Court is not the reason for the delay in the resolution 
of this case. The delay is the result of settlement negotiations 
and the parties being unable to agree upon the Findings of Fact 
and Conclusions of Law. Since the parties could not agree, the 
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Court, upon its own initiative, prepared Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law in accordance with its Memorandum Decision. 
The Court submitted its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law 
to counsel for review. Counsel have filed objections to the 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law. The Court took notice 
of the objections and modified or corrected paragraph 20 of the 
Findings of Fact and paragraphs 2, 4 and 9 of the Conclusions of 
Law. 
The Court now being fully advised in the premises and having 
rendered its oral decision and two written Memorandum Decisions, 
now makes the following final Findings of Fact and Conclusions of 
Law. 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. Plaintiffs are and were at all relevant times residents 
of Salt Lake County, State of Utah. 
2. The defendant Marital and Family Trusts of the Albert 
Eccles Family Trust, Herold L. Gregory, Trustee, are owners of 
certain real property located at approximately 2811 East 
Brookburn Road, Salt Lake City, Salt Lake County, State of Utah. 
3. Defendants Dean Bradshaw and Christi Bradshaw are 
individuals residing in Salt Lake County, State of Utah. 
4. Defendant Scott McNeil is an individual residing in 
Salt Lake County, State of Utah. 
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5. The real property owned by the defendant trusts was 
listed for sale. The real property listed, after negotiation for 
the sale and purchase thereof was divided into two parcels. At 
the time of trial the Court designated for identification 
purposes the two parcels as Parcel One and Parcel Two. 
6. Trustee represented to the plaintiffs that the 
southeasterly edge of the road was the boundary between Parcel 
One and Parcel Two, and that a 15 foot aesthetic easement along 
the southeasterly edge of the private road was to be included if 
and when trustee sold Parcel Two. 
7. The private road provided ingress and egress to Parcel 
One. 
8. Trustee did engage defendant McNeil to survey a one-
half acre lot on the southeasterly side of the private roadway 
for a building lot for Barbara Danielson. The Court designated 
said lot as Parcel Two. 
9. Plaintiffs and trustee entered into an Earnest Money 
Receipt and Offer to Purchase Agreement for Parcel One (including 
the private road) on March 18, 1986, which transaction was closed 
on August 1, 198 6. 
10. Defendants Bradshaws and trustee entered into an 
Earnest Money Receipt and Offer to Purchase Agreement for the 
purchase .of Parcel Two. The legal description used for Parcel 
Two had been prepared by defendant McNeil. 
GRAHN V. GRAHAM PAGE FIVE FINDINGS & CONCLUSIONS 
11. The Earnest Money Agreement entered into by defendants 
Bradshaws and trustee provided, among other things, that 
plaintiffs Grahns had first right of refusal to purchase Parcel 
Two. 
12. Trustee thereafter offered plaintiffs a first right of 
refusal to purchase Parcel Two which was not exercised by 
plaintiffs. 
13. The description to Parcel One was obtained by 
plaintiffs Grahn from the Salt Lake County Recorders Office. The 
description designated Parcel One as being 1.11 acres and 
accepted by the trustee and defendants Grahn as acreage to be 
sold and purchased. 
14. Plaintiffs Grahn and trustee understood that the 
southeasterly edge of the road was to be the boundary and the 
technical description did not conform to the intent of the 
plaintiffs Grahn and trustee. 
15. Plaintiffs Grahn, by including the road in Parcel One 
received in excess of 1.11 acres of land. 
16. At the time defendants Bradshaw executed the Earnest 
Money Receipt and Offer to Purchase Agreement for Parcel One, 
they did not rely upon the survey as describing the boundaries, 
but upon the physical boundary, the southeasterly side of the 
private* roadway. 
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17. The defendants Bradshaw did rely upon the reference 
made by defendant McNeil that Parcel Two contained .5 acres. 
18. The defendants Bradshaw needed .5 acres in order to 
obtain a building permit from the Salt Lake County Planning 
Commission. 
19. If Parcel Two did not contain .5 acres, defendant 
Bradshaws could terminate the agreement and trustee refund the 
purchase price. 
20. Prior to defendants Bradshaws closing on the purchase 
of Parcel Two, trustee discovered that the' McNeil survey was in 
error and the remapping of the survey of Parcel Two by defendant 
McNeil showed that a portion of the private road was contained in 
Parcel Two. 
21. Defendants Bradshaw did not have an enforceable 
agreement with Rocky Mountain Refractories. 
22. The legal description contemplated to be used for 
Parcel Two was in error and did not conform with the intent of 
the parties, that Parcel Two has located on the southeasterly 
edge of the private road. 
23. Plaintiffs did not rely upon defendant McNeil's survey 
of Parcel Two and were owed no duty by defendant McNeil. 
24. The Court makes no finding as to the trustee's claim 
against- McNeil at this time because counsel for trustee and 
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McNeil have advised the Court that this issue may be resolved by 
a stipulation between those parties. 
Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact, the Court now 
enters the following: 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. The deed between trustee and plaintiffs should be 
reformed to include the private roadway as Parcel One and 
plaintiffs should pay for the excess acreage. 
2. Plaintiffs Grahn and trustee stipulate that $12,604.04 
represents a fair value of the ground in excess of 1.11 acres. 
Interest shall be paid on the $12,604.06 commencing on a date 
determined by the Court. 
3. The reformed deed shall also acknowledge that the 
fifteen (15) foot aesthetic and geologic easement shall remain as 
agreed in the surviving provisions of the March 18, 1986 Earnest 
Money Receipt and Offer to Purchase Agreement, which easement 
runs along the southeasterly side of the private road. 
4. Defendant Bradshaws are not bona fide purchasers and 
therefore not entitled to specifically enforce the agreement for 
the purchase of Parcel Two, and except for the reformation 
referred to hereinabove, the parties shall be placed in the same 
position as before the Bradshaw transaction. 
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5t The transaction between trustee and defendants Bradshaw 
should be rescinded. 
6. Bradshaws have no cause of action against plaintiffs 
for the alleged prevention by injunction of the building of their 
home on Parcel Two. 
7. Plaintiffs have no cause of action against defendant 
McNeil for the erroneous first survey completed with respect to 
Parcel Two. 
8. The defendant trustee's claims against defendant McNeil 
may be pursued in separate litigation in a future action as 
provided by stipulation between defendant trustee and defendant 
McNeil. 
9. The Court does not award attorney's fees to any of the 
parties, but does award costs to the plaintiffs against all 
defendants except defendant McNeil. All other parties must bear 
their own costs and fees. 
Dated this r^ < day of December, 1988. 
#A^ 4 
JOHN A. ROKICH 
?RICT COURT JUDGE 
A T T E e l 
By 
Ucxkihc 
DWUJIY Gltf* 
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